The Right(wing) Stuff

One of my last blog posts considered Robert Heinlein's heated response to former Hewlett-Packard lab director Barney Oliver's suggestion that the sci-fi writer should reconsider his support of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Oliver, in a letter preserved in the Heinlein Archives, told Heinlein that Reagan's SDI - a space-based shield against incoming nuclear-tipped ICBMs - wouldn’t work as proponents imagined.Heinlein of course would have none of it. In fact, he implied that Oliver and other SDI opponents were practically guilty of treason. “Barney,” he said, “I am going to ask you to stand up and be counted.” He suggested that HP could be patriotic and profitable by getting on board the SDI bandwagon. And if not…then Oliver should just “back off and shut up; the grownups have work to do.”Why did Heinlein go nuclear? It wasn't just because of beliefs about God and country (or, in RH's case, country). No, his reaction was shaped by his conviction that he had helped get plans for SDI on the President Reagan's desk in the first place.The entry point for Heinlein's supposed influence over national security policy can be traced back to 1981 and the L5 Society. Formed in 1975, L5 was part of the grassroots pro-space movement that was catalyzed by physicist Gerard O'Neill's ideas for free-floating settlements in space. L5’s membership was relatively small, never more than 10,000 people or so. But it was a vocal – at times argumentative and prone to internal disagreements – group with a strong membership in regions where aerospace and defense-related industries were concentrated. Starting in the late 1970s, the political balance of L5 members began to shift to the right. The militarization of space - keenly promoted by Reaganites - was a divisive issue for L5'ers. The growing attention the L5 society gave for space industrialization, space commerce, and the militarization of space chronicles the group’s drift from counterculture-flavored technological enthusiasm – communes in space where one could pursue alternative lifestyle choices –  to tacit approval of Reagan’s conservative space agenda. As early as 1977, one “long time space advocate and futurist” pleaded that the society's newsletter present a variety of balanced and “socially conscientious” viewpoints that would be for the “betterment of the human race as a whole.” “Isn’t that what we are seeking,” he asked, “If it isn’t, damn you.” ((L5 News, July 1977: 7.))The changing makeup of L5’s board of directors nudged the group rightward. For example, by 1980, Jerry Pournelle had become one of the group’s most opinionated and voluble leaders. Before becoming a bestselling science fiction writer, Pournelle had contributed to speeches for Ronald Reagan when he was California’s governor.In 1981, ten days after Reagan was inaugurated, Pournelle coordinated a meeting of futurists, aerospace executives, former astronauts, L5 officers, and other technology enthusiasts at fellow sci-fi writer Larry Niven’s home in Tarzana. The occasion was the first meting of the “Citizens’ Advisory Council on National Space Policy." A few months later, the group issued a report (available here) based heavily (and somewhat unimaginatively) on a generic pro-business and pro-defense space agenda.

A sense of the group's membership can be seen in the following image; Heinlein's name can be seen about half-way down.

That same year, with underwriting from the Heritage Foundation and conservative donors, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham founded the High Frontier Project with several other influential Republicans. Nothing in Gerard O'Neill’s papers indicates how he felt about having his own phrase co-opted (Graham later claimed the choice was accidental) but, given his initial interest in the peaceful humanization of space, it is doubtful he would have approved. Graham and his allies used their political connections to establish a working relationship with the White House. The militarization of space – specifically, ballistic missile defense – figured prominently in their plans.

Eventually, Graham split with the group he helped start. Fearing that government bureaucrats would suffocate his ideas, he decided to, like O'Neill, take his ideas directly to the public. In his 1982 book High Frontier, Graham gave equal attention to space-based weapons and what he called the “non-military dimension” of space and generated lots of discussion inside the Beltway. ((Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington, DC: High Frontier, 1982.)) A few years later - this would be around 1983, the same time that Reagan announced SDI - a science-fiction press re-published Graham’s book. Who provided prefatory material to this new version? Yup. Robert Heinlein.Although Pournelle has suggested that reports by the Council were read at high political levels and perhaps even influenced Reagan’s speeches, it is a long way from holding ad-hoc meetings in Los Angeles suburbs to helping influence national security policy. ((Discussed of 170-171 of Michael A.G. Michaud, Reaching for the High Frontier: The American Pro-Space Movement, 1972-1984 (New York: Praeger, 1986). Also, see Andrew J. Butrica's excellent Single Stage to Orbit: Politics, Space Technology, and the Quest for Reusable Rocketry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). A web-based debate over the issue of influence followed a 1999 piece by sci-fi writer Norman Spinrad, “Too High the Moon” was at http://mondediplo.com/1999/07/14star  but this can now only be accessed via the Internet Archive. Pournelle’s response is at: http://www.jerrypournelle.com/debates/nasa-sdi.html)) Evidence is circumstantial but former White House executives would understandably resist suggestions that a group that included sci-fi writers and futurists could wield influence. Moreover, many factors influenced Reagan’s thinking regarding space-based weapons ((Including a 1940 film he had been in that featured an “inertia projector” that could disable enemy aircraft. Murder in the Air (Warner Brothers, 1940) is described in Frances Fitzgerald’s Way Out There in the Blue, 22-23.))Despite this, Heinlein believed that he and the other members of the Citizens' Advisory Council did have influence on Reagan's thinking. This belief is evident in his 1985 riposte to Barney Oliver:

Heinlein writes - "It was not Mr. Reagan's "Star Wars" speech that got me involved in this [SDI]...it was endless effort by a mere handful of us that got the matter to Mr. Reagan's attention and resulted in his "Star Wars" speech." Oliver, in Heinlein's view, wasn't just questioning the author's patriotism or his belief about national defense. He was also - perhaps unknowingly - questioning work Heinlein had done, efforts, which - Heinlein believed - had helped craft a major new technology initiative.

Was Heinlein right? I don't think so. The history of SDI has been picked over very well by many scholars, including my colleague Peter Westwick. Nothing has come to light that I'm aware of that illustrates a direct link between Heinlein's advocacy and Reagan's speech. Yes, Heinlein advocated space-based weapons before Reagan's SDI speech in March 1983...but this does not mean this advocacy was heard and translated into policy. Until firm proof comes to light, Heinlein's convictions are more grounded in fiction than fact.